Abstract. Homomorphic encryption schemes are an essential ingredient to design protocols where different users interact in order to obtain some information from the others, at the same time that each user keeps private some of his information. When the algebraic structure underlying these protocols is complicated, then standard homomorphic encryption schemes are not enough, because they do not allow to compute at the same time additions and products of plaintexts through the manipulation of ciphertexts. In this work we define a theoretical object, t-chained encryption schemes, which can be used to compute additions and products of t integer values, by ciphertext manipulation. Efficient solutions have been previously proposed only for the case t = 2. Our solution is not only theoretical: we show that some existing IND-CPA secure (pseudo)homomorphic encryption schemes (some of them based on lattices) can be used to implement in practice the concept of t-chained encryption scheme.
Introduction
In 1978 Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos introduced privacy homomorphisms [1] , which are public key encryption schemes that map an operation on the ciphertext space to an operation on the plaintext space. Such schemes allow therefore to modify plaintexts through ciphertext manipulation. Privacy homomorphisms are also known as homomorphic (public-key) encryption schemes and are usually classified by the operation they allow to compute on the plaintext space: multiplicatively homomorphic schemes, such as RSA [2] or El Gamal [3] , allow to compute a product; and additively homomorphic schemes, such as Paillier [4] , allow to compute a sum. An homomorphic public-key encryption scheme that allows to compute both sums and products of plaintexts through ciphertext manipulation is called an algebraic homomorphic public-key encryption scheme.
Additively homomorphic public-key encryption schemes have many applications such as computing with encrypted functions (or with encrypted data), multi-party computation, zero-knowledge proofs, oblivious transfer, commitment schemes, etc. A large survey of these applications (and an associated bibliography) is done by Rappe in [5] . Rappe also highlights that being able to arbitrarily compute sums and products of encrypted plaintexts (with a secure algebraic homomorphic scheme, for example) would result in a dramatic improvement on performance and functionality of many applications.
Unfortunately, only a few algebraic homomorphic public-key encryption schemes have been proposed in the literature and all of them have been broken. Fellows and Koblitz proposed Polly Cracker [6] which cannot be considered secure [7] , and Grigoriev and Ponomarenko proposed a scheme [8] which was broken in [9] . As Fontaine and Galand note in their survey on homomorphic encryption [10] , no satisfactory solution has been proposed so far, and given the conjecture by Boneh and Lipton that algebraic homomorphic encryption the public key. Alice can use the additively homomorphic properties of the scheme to compute an encryption of F (a 1 , . . . , a n ), which is sent back to Bob. Finally, Bob decrypts and obtains the desired value. If the encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure Bob's security is ensured.
It is often necessary to evaluate higher degree polynomials either to improve performance or to unlock new applications (see [5] ), and additively homomorphic encryption schemes do not provide a straight solution to these situations. A fully algebraic homomorphic public-key encryption scheme would solve this problem, but as we have noted before, there is not any such scheme right now.
The encryption scheme proposed by Boneh, Goh and Nissim allows to evaluate polynomials of degree t = 2, as long as the output F (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is a small number (the computational cost of decryption is linear on this number). For this reason they propose to use it for 2-DNF formula evaluation, which can be derived from polynomial evaluation with a decryption cost in O(1), as long as ciphertext size is at least in O(log L), being L the number of sums done.
Sander, Young and Yung propose an alternative approach [22] based on an uncommon usage of additively homomorphic encryption schemes, which allows to compute any boolean formula. The major drawback of their approach is that a given ciphertext's size is exponential in the number of operations it has undergone and thus the scheme can only be used to evaluate functions with logarithmic depth. Many applications need linear depth functions to be evaluated and thus, despite the generality of the solution provided by Sander, Young and Yung, the number of applications based on this scheme in the literature is similar to the case of Boneh, Goh and Nissim's scheme.
In this paper we focus on SFE to highlight our construction's practicality. We will see that t-chained schemes, introduced in this work, can be used to evaluate any polynomial of degree t ensuring Bob's security as long as the underlying encryption schemes are IND-CPA secure.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2 we describe the general idea and a simple example of our construction. We recall in Section 3.1 some basic concepts on (pseudo)homomorphic encryption schemes. The main part of our work is presented in Section 3. We first recall some basic concepts on (pseudo)homomorphic encryption schemes, and we prove some technical results involving (pseudo)homomorphisms, which can be of independent interest. After that, the concept of t-chained encryption scheme is introduced. In Section 4 we explain how to use t-chained encryption schemes to securely evaluate a t-degree polynomial; we discuss the security of the protocol and we briefly present some of its applications in Appendix C. We finally give, in Section 5, some examples of t-chained encryption schemes (for t = 2 and t = 3) that can be obtained by using some existing (pseudo)homomorphic encryption schemes.
Overview of Our Solution

Basic Idea
From a theoretical point of view, an algebraic encryption scheme would have an encryption function E which is a ring homomorphism between (Z s , +, ·) and some ring (R, + R , · R ).
3 Some encryption functions, as for example ElGamal's [3] , ensure naturally a group homomorphism between (Z * s , ·) and the group of associated ciphertexts. Other encryption functions, as Paillier's [4] , ensure a group homomorphism between (Z s , +) and the group of ciphertexts. As noted in the introduction, all the cryptosystems with an encryption function that is a ring homomorphism between (Z s , +, ·) and some ring have been broken.
The proposal of Boneh, Goh and Nissim is very interesting from a theoretical point of view. Indeed, their cryptosystem provides two group homomorphic encryption functions E 1 and E 2 such that where E 2 (x) = e(E 1 (x), 1) and e(·, ·) is a bilinear map such that e(E 1 (a 1 ), E 1 (a 2 )) = e(E 1 (a 1 · a 2 ), 1) = E 2 (a 1 · a 2 ). Starting from encryptions E 1 (a 1 ) and E 1 (a 2 ), it is thus possible to obtain encryptions (according to E 2 ) of both a 1 +a 2 and a 1 ·a 2 . The bilinear map e(·, ·) is a Weil pairing over an elliptic curve. Unfortunately, once in G 2 it is not possible to use a second pairing in order to compute more products. Our motivating goal was to obtain a chain of homomorphic encryption functions and bilinear pairings such that for any t we have:
With such a structure (and the right properties on the bilinear functions), the inductive limit of the disjoint union R t = t i=1 G i is isomorphic to a ring. Even if such a structure does not represent a ring and an associated ring homomorphism, it provides at least a series of groups and group homomorphisms which have a ring and a ring homomorphism as a limit. Unfortunately, our construction is slightly weaker than the aforementioned one, and such a ring cannot be defined. Nevertheless, from a practical point of view we are still able to compute as with such a structure.
A Simple Construction
A real construction of a scheme allowing to do t multiplications is a little bit complex and is described in the following sections, but we will present here an 'ideal world' construction as its simplicity allows to grab the principles our construction is based on. Suppose that, for any s ∈ Z + , we can obtain a cryptosystem with an encryption function E : Z s → Z s , such that E(a 1 ) + E(a 2 ) = E(a 1 + a 2 ). Starting from a value s 1 ∈ Z + , it is then possible to:
Because of the chosen parameters we have
the first two equalities being verified as the homomorphic property of E 2 (resp.
). We thus have:
Of course, this construction can be generalized if we obtain additive schemes E 1 , . . . , E t such that
Unfortunately, the existing additive schemes that we could use to realize this 'ideal world' construction only provide a pseudohomomorphic property (properly defined in the next section) and not a real homomorphism. Moreover, in many cases we do not have E :
In fact, we will use a cryptosystem such that E : Z s → Z s (s being very large) in our practical constructions in Section 5. However, using it directly leads to a very inefficient construction. We will thus modify it to obtain an encryption function E : Z s → Z n s with a small s and a large n . In Section 3.1, we provide basic definitions and in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we show how to modify the existing encryption schemes to fit our needs. Then, in Section 3.4 we provide a general construction derived from the intuitive one that we have just presented.
t-Chained Pseudohomomorphic Encryption Schemes
In this section we define t-chained encryption schemes, the basic tool of our protocols. In order to do this we first define L-pseudohomomorphisms, and prove some of their properties through a small set of lemmas and propositions. The (sketched) proofs are given in Appendix B.1, except when they deal with security issues in which case they have been included in the main text (when not trivial).
Preliminaries: (Pseudo)Homomorphic Encryption
A public key encryption scheme P KE = (KG, E, D) consists of three probabilistic and polynomial time algorithms. The key generation algorithm KG takes as input a security parameter (for example, the desired length for the secret key) and outputs a pair (sk, pk) of secret and public keys. The encryption algorithm takes as input a plaintext m corresponding to some set of plaintexts M, some randomness r ∈ R and a public key pk, and outputs a ciphertext c = E pk (m, r) ∈ C, where C is the ciphertexts' space. Finally, the decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext and a secret key, and gives a plaintext m = D sk (c) as output. In the rest of the paper, for simplicity of the notation, we will only include explicitly the randomness as an input of the encryption functions and the public key as their index when necessary.
We say that P KE = (KG, E, D) is pseudohomomorphic if M and C have both a group structure (with operations ⊕ M and ⊕ C , respectively; we will write (M, ⊕ M ) and (C, ⊕ C )), and the property
Again the index of the operation will only be included explicitly when necessary and often we will just
. This is important as often the function E : M → C is not surjective. In order to avoid cumbersome notations,Ẽ(x) will represent an element of D −1 (x) just as E(x) represents an element of {E(x, r)|r ∈ R}. We thus have E(m 1 ) ⊕ E(m 2 ) =Ẽ(m 1 ⊕ m 2 ). With these ideas in mind, one can consider the following definition.
Definition 1. A public key encryption scheme which satisfies
, then we can iteratively apply this result to deduce that
We will say that such encryption schemes are ∞-pseudohomomorphic (or simply homomorphic). Note that if E is surjective for any element y ∈ D −1 (x) there is an r ∈ R such that y = E(x, r). Thus if E is surjective and 2-pseudohomomorphic then E(m 1 ) ⊕ E(m 2 ) = E(m 1 ⊕ m 2 ) and thus E is (fully) homomorphic.
With respect to security, it is well-known that homomorphic schemes can never achieve security against chosen-ciphertext attacks. For this reason, we will consider indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA). Roughly speaking, an encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure if, knowing only the public key, it is computationally hard to distinguish between two encryptions of two different plaintexts. A more formal definition of this security property can be found in Appendix A.
Extending Pseudohomomorphic Encryption Schemes
Following the idea of Definition 1 one can define a pseudohomomorphic relation between two groups by: Definition 2. Let (G 1 , ⊕ 1 ) and (G 2 , ⊕ 2 ) be two groups and
Pseudohomomorphisms can be combined with pseudohomomorphic encryption schemes in order to change their plaintext or ciphertext space without changing the security properties of the cryptosystem. This is stated in the next proposition.
is a min(L, L )-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme. Moreover, in both cases, if P KE is IND-CPA secure, P KE is IND-CPA secure too.
Proof. (sketch) Suppose that P KE is a plaintext space extension. For any k ≤ min(L, L ) and any
The same proof can be done if P KE is a ciphertext extension. IND-CPA for P KE in the first case is ensured as distinguishing two plaintexts x 1 , x 2 in P KE implies distinguishing φ(x 1 ), φ(x 2 ) in P KE and φ must be injective. In the second case, being φ public, distinguishing x 1 , x 2 in P KE implies distinguishing them also in P KE.
Twisting Additive Pseudohomomorphic Encryption Schemes
If for a given L-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme, its plaintext space is (Z s , +) n for some positive integers s, n ∈ Z + , we say that the scheme is plaintext additive. If its ciphertext space is (Z s , +) n for some positive integers s , n ∈ Z + , we say that the scheme is ciphertext additive. When a plaintext or ciphertext space is (Z s , +) n we will call s its order and n its dimension. These schemes can be easily modified using Proposition 1 and simple L-pseudohomomorphisms.
The proof (available in Appendix B) uses a simple construction that we will associate to this lemma. The main idea is to split each coordinate of an element in (Z s , +) n in k-bit blocks, and to form a vector of dimension n , each k-bit block being the binary representation of a coordinate. Computing with such a vector in (Z s , +)
n for a large enough s ensures that the process is reversible.
Corollary 1. Let P KE be a ciphertext additive L-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme with ciphertext space (Z s , +) n . For any k ∈ Z + , it is possible to lower the order of the ciphertext space s to any value s such that (2 k − 1) · L < s < s by increasing the dimension n to n = n · (log 2 s)/k . This transformation preserves indistinguishability.
It is thus possible to split ciphertexts in order to have many small elements instead of one large element while preserving the pseudohomomorphic and indistinguishability properties. The extreme case happens when one considers k = 1, i.e. the initial ciphertexts of P KE, which are elements in (Z s , +) n , are transformed into elements of (Z 2 , +) n· log 2 s (vectors of bits). To preserve the L-pseudohomomorphic properties, however, we will see these bits as elements of Z s , for some s between L and s, as stated in the previous lemma and corollary.
For an encryption function E with ciphertext space (Z s , +) n , let us denote as E ∞ the maximum value that can be in a component of E(x), for all possible plaintexts x. Of course, we have E ∞ ≤ s, but in general this value can be much smaller. For example, if we apply the construction of Lemma 1 to an encryption function E, then we obtain E ∞ ≤ 2 k − 1, and in the particular case where k = 1, we will have E ∞ ≤ 1.
The following lemmas give tools to increase the ciphertext space order of a ciphertext additive scheme, and to modify the plaintext space dimension of a plaintext additive scheme.
Lemma 3. A plaintext additive L-pseudohomomorphic scheme P KE with plaintext space (Z s , +) n can be transformed into a plaintext additive L-pseudohomomorphic scheme P KE with plaintext space (Z s , +) kn , for any k ∈ Z + . This transformation preserves indistinguishability.
Lemma 4. For any s, n ∈ Z + and any < n we define π
Corollary 2. A plaintext additive L-pseudohomomorphic scheme P KE with plaintext space (Z s , +) n can be transformed into a plaintext additive L-pseudohomomorphic scheme P KE with plaintext space (Z s , +) , for any ∈ Z + . This transformation preserves indistinguishability.
Summing up, it is possible to increase or reduce the ciphertext order of a ciphertext additive scheme, possibly changing the ciphertext dimension, and to increase or reduce the plaintext dimension of a plaintext additive scheme, without changing its order. Moreover, each of these operations preserves indistinguishability. Combining these results, we will be able to modify the schemes in a given chain in such a way that the order and dimension of the ciphertext space of a scheme are equal to the order and dimension of the plaintext space of the following scheme in the chain.
t-Chained Schemes
For simplicity, we start with the case of chains with t = 2 schemes. We propose a way to adapt a plaintext additive pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme P KE 2 in order to encrypt the ciphertexts of a plaintext and ciphertext additive pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme P KE 1 , in such a way that the imbrication of both schemes leads to a new plaintext additive pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme called 2-chained. Definition 3. Let P KE 1 = (KG 1 , E 1 , D 1 ) be a plaintext and ciphertext additive L 1 -pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme with associated plaintext and ciphertext spaces (Z s1 , +) and (Z s2 , +) n2 , and let P KE 2 = (KG 2 , E 2 , D 2 ) be a plaintext additive L 2 -pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme with associated plaintext and ciphertext spaces (Z s2 , +) and (C 2 , ⊕ 2 ).
Set P KE 2 = (KG 2 , E 2 , D 2 ) as the plaintext additive L 2 -pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme with plaintext space (Z s2 , +) n2 and ciphertext space (C 2 , ⊕ 2 ) n2 derived from P KE 2 (using Lemma 3), such that
We define the 2-chained encryption scheme derived from P KE 1 and P KE 2 as P KE = (KG, E, D) with:
The resulting 2-chained encryption scheme P KE has plaintext space (Z s1 , +) and ciphertext space (C 2 , ⊕ 2 ) n2 . The following proposition describes the security and pseudohomomorphic properties of such a scheme.
Proposition 2. A 2-chained encryption scheme P KE is a plaintext additive L-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme with L = min(L 1 , L 2 ). If one of the encryption schemes used to create the 2-chained scheme is IND-CPA secure, then P KE is also IND-CPA secure.
Proof. (sketch) Lemma 3 proves that if P KE 2 is IND-CPA secure then P KE 2 is IND-CPA secure too. The 2-chained scheme can be seen as an extension of P KE 2 with the L 1 -pseudohomomorphism (E 1 , D 1 ) or as an extension of P KE 1 with the L 2 -pseudohomomorphism (E 2 , D 2 ). In any case, Proposition 1 proves that the resulting 2-chained scheme is a plaintext additive min(L 1 , L 2 )-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme, and IND-CPA secure if any of P KE 1 or P KE 2 are IND-CPA secure.
Note that in Definition 3 we are implicitly assuming that the order s 2 of the ciphertext space of P KE 1 is the same as the order of the plaintext space of P KE 2 . The lemmas of Section 3.3 show that in order to obtain 2-chained schemes, the only thing we need is to be able to create plaintext and ciphertext additive pseudohomomorphic encryption schemes with large enough plaintext order. This is specified by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For any L, if there is a family of plaintext and ciphertext additive L-pseudohomomorphic encryption schemes such that the plaintext space order can be chosen arbitrarily large, it is possible to construct a 2-chained L-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme.
Proof. (sketch) Suppose that, for any positive integer s, we can take a ciphertext and plaintext additive L-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme P KE such that E : (Z s , +) n → (Z s , +) n , where n, s , n may depend on s.
Set P KE 1 as such a scheme for a given s 1 . We denote as (Z s1 , +) n1 and (Z s 1 , +) n 1 the plaintext and ciphertext spaces of this cryptosystem. Set P KE 2 as a second scheme with plaintext and ciphertext spaces (Z s2 , +) n2 and (Z s 2 , +) n 2 , such that the plaintext order s 2 satisfies s 2 /s 1 > L. Using Lemma 4 we lower the plaintext dimension of these schemes to one and obtain two L-pseudohomomorphic schemes P KE 1 and P KE 2 . Using Lemma 2 we increase the ciphertext space order of P KE 1 to s 2 and obtain an L-pseudohomomorphic scheme P KE 1 (as s 2 /s 1 > L).
P KE 1 (resp. P KE 2 ) is L-pseudohomomorphic and has plaintext and ciphertext spaces (Z s1 , +) and (Z s2 , +) n 1 (resp. (Z s2 , +) and (Z s 2 , +) n 2 ). These schemes satisfy the properties required in Definition 3 and can therefore be used to construct a 2-chained L-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme.
Generalization. If P KE 2 is plaintext and ciphertext additive, the 2-chained scheme constructed above is implicitly plaintext and ciphertext additive. Note that in this case, we can use it for further imbrications. We thus define a t-chained scheme, as the consecutive imbrication of t − 1 plaintext and ciphertext pseudohomomorphic schemes P KE 1 , P KE 2 , . . . , P KE t−1 and of one plaintext pseudohomomorphic scheme P KE t (all of them resulting from properly twisting some initial schemes, as explained in Section 3.3). The encryption diagram of a t-chained scheme would be
nt .
Propositions 2 and 3 are trivially generalized. This scheme is thus
And it is IND-CPA secure if some P KE i is IND-CPA secure. In [23] , Kawachi, Tanaka and Xagawa propose a set of lattice-based ciphertext and plaintext additive pseudohomomorphic encryption schemes, derived from [24] [25] [26] [27] , that are proved to be IND-CPA secure under standard assumptions. In these schemes, L and the plaintext space order can be set to any value in Z + and thus they can be used to implement t-chained encryptions schemes.
Secure Function Evaluation with t-Chained Schemes
Maybe the most important consequence of the existence of t-chained encryption schemes is that they can be used for computing over ciphertexts. Namely a t-chained encryption scheme P KE = (KG, E, D) resulting from the schemes P KE 1 , . . . , P KE t can be used by anyone to: (i) Compute ciphertexts E 1 (a), . . . , E t (a), E(a) of any of the encryption schemes P KE 1 , . . . , P KE t , P KE.
(ii) Given L ciphertexts E(a 1 ), . . . , E(a L ), anyone can publicly compute an element C, such that D(C) = a 1 + · · · + a L . (iii) Given a set of t ciphertexts E 1 (a 1 ), . . . , E t (a t ), anyone can publicly compute an element C, such that
In particular, a t-chained encryption scheme can thus be used for secure evaluation of multivariate polynomials (of total degree t). In order to show how this is done, and for simplicity of the explanation, let us consider first the case of a 2-chained scheme. Then we will informally present the general case.
Secure Evaluation of the Sum and Product of Two Inputs
Let P KE 1 , P KE 2 , P KE 2 , and P KE denote the cryptosystems introduced in Definition 3.
Sum of inputs. Proposition 2 states that
n2 , for i = 1, 2. Then, if L ≥ 2, anyone can operate these ciphertexts to obtain C = C 1 ⊕ 2 C 2 =Ẽ(a 1 + a 2 ). Recall that we use notationẼ(x) to represent an element of D −1 (x). The owner of sk = (sk 1 , sk 2 ) can decrypt C, by applying
Product of inputs. Regarding secure evaluation of the product, given two values a 1 ∈ Z s1 and a 2 ∈ Z s2 , we can consider the ciphertexts
where the first operation has to be interpreted as 'applying ⊕ 2 to E 2 (a 2 ) a number E (l) 1 (a 1 ) of times'. The first equality is true if L 2 ≥ E 1 ∞ , where ∞ is the norm defined in Section 3.3. It is important to be precise as this value can be much smaller than the space order s 2 . Indeed, in our practical examples we will use Lemma 1 with k = 1 and thus we will have E 1 ∞ = 1, whereas s 2 >> 1. The second equality in the above array is true if L 1 ≥ a 2 , and the two last equalities hold because of the definitions of P KE 2 and P KE.
General Case
Although we have explained the case t = 2 for simplicity, the computing techniques can be easily generalized for greater values of t. We skip the details due to the cumbersome notation. As an informal example with t = 3, if we are interested in the product a 1 a 2 a 3 , we have to provide a ciphertext E 3 (a 3 ). Once the first multiplication has been done, we haveẼ 2 (Ẽ 1 (a 1 a 2 ) ), which belongs to (Z s3 , +) n3 (using the notations of the generalization at the end of Section 3.4). Therefore, this ciphertext can be represented as (Ẽ (1) 2 (Ẽ 1 (a 1 a 2 ) a 1 a 2 )) ). The same procedure as before (i.e. 'multiplying' each component of this vector with E 3 (a 3 )) can be applied to obtain: a 1 a 2 ))a 3 a 1 a 2 )a 3 ) a 1 a 2 a 3 ) a 1 a 2 a 3 ) )) a 1 a 2 a 3 ) )) =Ẽ (a 1 a 2 a 3 ) .
Note that the number of operations involving ciphertexts of the different encryption functions in the chain increases with t. In this case, we must have L 1 > a 2 a 3 , L 2 > E 1 ∞ a 3 , and L 3 > E 2 ∞ . In the general case of t-chained schemes, in order to compute the ciphertextẼ(a 1 · · · a t ), we must have
Summing up, the presented t-chained encryption schemes can be used to evaluate t-degree multivariate polynomials on ciphertexts. Namely, if F (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a n-variate polynomial over Z s of total degree t, and with m monomials, one can consider encryptions C i,j = E i (a j ), for i = 1, . . . , t and j = 1, . . . , n, and anyone can compute an encryptionC of the value F (a 1 , . . . , a n ) mod s 1 . We represent such a polynomial by  F (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = m r=1 λ r M r , M r being a monomial of degree at most t. In order to evaluate the polynomial:
1. Each monomial M r is computed by multiplying the associated ciphertexts;
If the monomial has degree t < t it is then multiplied by t − t encryption of 1; 2. The monomial M r is added to itself λ r times; 3. The results of each monomial computation are summed up.
The constraints associated to the values L 1 , . . . , L t are easy to derive from the ones we presented for sum and product computation. Namely, we must have
. . , t, noting λ and a the maximum possible values for λ 1 , . . . , λ m and a 1 , . . . , a n respectively.
Note that for boolean polynomials we have a = λ = 1 and thus if we manage to have E i−1 ∞ = 1 the only constraint is L i > m for i ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
Some applications of SFE in which having t > 2 is relevant are presented in Appendix C
Security
As stated by Proposition 2, a t-chained scheme P KE (with underlying schemes P KE 1 , . . . , P KE t ), is IND-CPA secure as long as one of the underlying schemes is IND-CPA secure. This means that the ciphertexts of any plaintext pair m 1 , m 2 resulting from the encryption with E = E t • · · · • E 1 are indistinguishable. When requiring a secure evaluation of a polynomial, a user (Bob) holding a secret input a j does not know which operations are going to be done with this input. He should thus encrypt this value with all the underlying encryption schemes of the chain, producing C i,j = E i (a j ) for i = 1, . . . , t, so that the value may be used at any point of a product or sum evaluation. Therefore, when considering to use a t-chained scheme for secure function evaluation we are not interested in the IND-CPA security of the t-chained scheme P KE, but on the IND-CPA security of the scheme P KE G defined by E G (x) = (E 1 (x), . . . , E t (x)). Proposition 4. If t encryption schemes E 1 , . . . , E t are all ε-indistinguishable under CPA attacks, then the global encryption scheme E G (x) = (E 1 (x), . . . , E t (x)) is tε-indistinguishable under CPA attacks.
The proof of this Proposition can be found in Appendix B.2. The final conclusion is that our protocol for Secure Function Evaluation offers security for Bob, despite the publication of all the ciphertexts C i,j = E i (a j ), for i = 1, . . . , t and j = 1, . . . , n, as long as all the encryption schemes P KE 1 , . . . , P KE t are IND-CPA secure. Some details on the privacy of the function (i.e. symmetric security) are given in Appendix D.
Specific Realizations
The encryption scheme of Boneh, Goh and Nissim allows to compute products of two operands. In this section we will provide two schemes that allow to compute products of three operands.
2-Chained Encryption Schemes for 3-DNF Secure Evaluation
As noted at the end of Section 3.4, the lattice-based additively pseudohomomorphic schemes that have been proposed by Kawachi, Tanaka and Xagawa in [23] , derived from [24] [25] [26] [27] , can be used to construct a t-chained scheme for any value of t, in particular for t = 3. Our idea here is to achieve the same functionality as in a 3-chained scheme (e.g. private evaluation of multi-variate polynomials with degree up to 3) by constructing a 2-chained scheme which uses as P KE 2 the scheme of Boneh-Goh-Nissim. It is possible to set t > 2 by chaining multiple times lattice-based schemes and once at the end Boneh-Goh-Nissim. However, ciphertext size grows quickly, and therefore we present here just the case t = 2. This scheme allows to securely evaluate, in the sense of SFE, 3-DNF boolean formulas with billions of disjunctions (and thus with billions of depth levels) which could not be done in practice with any of the previously existing SFE protocols. For a definition of DNF formulas, and of how they are related to boolean polynomials, see Appendix C.
Regarding P KE 1 , we consider one of the schemes proposed in [23] . It is a variant of [25] (noted hereafter mR04), whose IND-CPA security is based on a worse-case reduction toÕ(n 1.5+r ) − uSV P for a given parameter r. In mR04, the encryption and decryption functions form an L-pseudohomomorphism (E, D) from (Z p , +) to (Z N , +) with N = 2 8n 2 , being n a security parameter such that L × p < n r . The encryption system has a decryption error probability which for practical parameters is negligible, and thus will not be considered in our simple practical constructions.
Choosing p > L, we can apply Lemma 1 to this scheme, with k = 1, to obtain an L-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme P KE 1α with plaintext space (Z p , +) and ciphertext space (Z p , +) 8n 2 , such that E 1α ∞ = 1. We take a hard-to-factor modulus N P > p × L and we consider the pseudohomomorphism from (Z p , +) to (Z N P , +) described in Lemma 2. In this way, we obtain P KE 1 , an L-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme with plaintext space (Z p , +) and ciphertext space (Z N P , +)
Let P KE 2 be an instance of Boneh-Goh-Nissim's encryption scheme for the modulus N P . P KE 2 is an ∞-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme with plaintext space (Z N P , +) and ciphertext space (G, ×). Applying the construction given in Definition 3, we obtain a 2-chained L-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme P KE with plaintext space (Z p , +) and ciphertext space (G, ×) Theorem 1. The 2-chained encryption scheme P KE is IND-CPA secure assuming either that theÕ(n 1.5+r )− uSV P problem is hard or that the subgroup decision problem is hard in G. Moreover, it is possible to use it for Secure Function Evaluation of 3-DNF boolean functions with up to L disjunctions if both problems are assumed to be hard.
The resulting 2-chained encryption scheme allows to start from ciphertexts c 1 = E 1 (a 1 ), c 2 = E 2 (a 2 ), for integer values a 1 , a 2 , and to obtain a ciphertext C 12 = E 2 (E 1 (a 1 a 2 ) ) ∈ G. Now, for a third integer a 3 , we can consider the ciphertext c 3 = E 2 (a 3 ) ∈ G. Using the bilinear map of the scheme by Boneh-Goh-Nissim, we can compute a ciphertext C = e(C 12 , c 3 ). This ciphertext C is an encryption of a 1 a 2 a 3 , according to a different cryptosystem related to P KE 2 , which can be decrypted by the owner of the secret key of the scheme P KE 2 .
Note that Boneh-Goh-Nissim ciphertexts can only be decrypted if the associated plaintexts are small. We have E 1 ∞ = 1 and thus plaintexts will be small if the integers a i are small too. This makes this t-chained encryption scheme specially adapted for boolean formula evaluation. Using the technique proposed by Boneh, Goh and Nissim for DNF formula evaluation, we will set p = L + 1. Thus, as ciphertext size is in O(n 2 ), for an optimal choice of n (such that L × p n r ) we have a ciphertext size in O(L 4/r ). The asymptotic ciphertext growth in the formula depth is polynomial, whereas with the technique of Sander, Young and Yung [22] it is exponential.
The underlying security problem of mR04,Õ(n 1.5+r ) − uSV P , has been solved for n 10 and r 10 but is believed to be unfeasible for r = 10 and n 100 [28] . Thus, a concrete instantiation of mR04 could be: n = 100, r = 10, p = 10 9 + 1 and L = 10 9 , which verify p × L < n r and L < p. We can set a 1024-bit modulus for Boneh-Goh-Nissim which corresponds to current standards on factorization and ensures N P > L × p. With these parameters, our 2-chained encryption scheme would be 10 9 -pseudohomomorphic, with plaintext space (Z 10 9 +1 , +) and ciphertext space (G, ×) 80000 , an element of G being represented by 2048 bits. Ciphertexts will therefore be a few megabytes long and the scheme will be usable to evaluate 3-DNF boolean formulas with depth up to 10 9 . Again, the protocol of Sander, Young and Yung [22] also allows to evaluate such formulas, but ciphertext size will be in O(e 10 
t-Chained Encryption Schemes for General Use
In [29] , Aguilar, Castagnos and Gaborit propose a lattice-based homomorphic encryption scheme which is ciphertext and plaintext additive. The IND-CPA security of this scheme is based on a non-standard security assumption, the hardness of a problem they named the Differential Knapsack Vector Problem, which as its name states is a variation of the Knapsack Problem against which traditional lattice-reduction attacks seem ineffective. In this scheme, noted hereafter ACG08, the encryption and decryption functions form an L-pseudohomomorphism (E, D) from (Z p , +)
N to (Z q , +) 2N with q = K ×p 2 ×L, being K and N two security parameters.
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , t} we set P KE iα as an instance of ACG08 from (Z pi , +) N to (Z qi , +) 2N such that p 1 = p and p i = q i−1 for i > 1. Using Lemma 4 on each of these schemes we obtain P KE i with plaintext space (Z pi , +) and ciphertext space (Z qi , +) 2N . Applying the construction given in Definition 3 iteratively, we obtain a t-chained L-pseudohomomorphic encryption scheme P KE with plaintext space (Z p , +) and ciphertext space (Z qt , +)
Nt with q t = (K × L × p) 2t−1 × p and N t = (2N ) t . Again, the following theorem is a direct result of Propositions 2 and 4.
Theorem 2. The t-chained encryption scheme P KE is IND-CPA secure assuming that the Differential Knapsack Vector Problem is hard. Moreover, with the same assumption, it is possible to use it for Secure Function Evaluation of t-degree multivariate polynomials over Z p with up to L monomials.
Ciphertext size is ((2t−1) log(K ×L×p)+log p)×(2N ) t , which is still exponential in t but just logarithmic in L. With this t-chained scheme there is no issue on decryption and thus it can be used for SFE of t-degree polynomials over an arbitrary ring Z p or on any of the other applications of homomorphic schemes.
Based on the security parameters proposed in [29] , we can set N = 50 and K = 2 20 . For t = 3 we have a ciphertext size of roughly ten megabytes, for values of p and L close to one. Since the growth of the ciphertext size is logarithmic in these parameters, it remains pretty much the same for larger values of p, L. For example, for p = 2 32 , L = 2 32 ciphertext size is just multiplied by a factor 4 (and not 64 as we already have K = 2 20 ) and for p = 2 100 , L = 2 100 it is multiplied by a factor 10.
Conclusion
The construction we have presented in this paper provides a general way to obtain additively homomorphic schemes that allow to compute products of t operands. We have presented two specific implementations, but many other alternatives can be considered: for example a 3-chained encryption scheme could have been obtained from chaining twice mR04 instances with Paillier's encryption scheme which would have given an alternative 3-chained scheme for general use based on uSVP and the subgroup decision problem. The performance differences between the proposed schemes illustrates the fact that the efficiency of our generic construction depends much on the underlying encryption schemes. In fact, there is no reason for the growth to be exponential in t, even if the underlying encryption schemes are randomized (and thus have an expansion factor in ]1; ∞[). Indeed, in [30] Lipmaa uses Damgård-Jurik [31] , an additively homomorphic encryption scheme, to iteratively encrypt data with a function E 1 • · · · • E t such that E i has an expansion factor (i + 1)/i > 1. The global scheme has therefore an expansion factor t i=1 (i + 1)/i = t + 1, which grows linearly. Unfortunately, Damgård-Jurik is not ciphertext additive and cannot therefore be used in our construction. But Lipmaa's technique shows that linear growth in t is possible if the underlying schemes enjoy some suitable properties.
Finally, we would like to highlight that due to space limitations we have focused on SFE, which is very illustrative of our schemes' practicality. However, an homomorphic encryption scheme has many applications beyond SFE (see [5] ). We hope our research will motivate the analysis of such applications.
